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Abstract
We have developed a security model that facilitates 
control of resources by autonomous peers who act on
behalf of collaborating users. This model allows a gradual
build-up of trust. It enables secure interactions among
users that do not necessarily know each other and allows
them to build trust over the course of their collaboration.
This paper describes various aspects of our security model
and describes an architecture that implements this model
to provide security in pure peer-to-peer environments.
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1. Introduction
Applications based on peer-to-peer (P2P)
architectures have become popular because they allow
information to flow freely between distributed
components.  However, this very feature holds back the
acceptance of these applications by the corporate and
scientific communities.  In these communities, the
information flow needs to be controlled. For example, a
group of collaborating scientists would like to share the
initial findings of their research within their group, but do
not want these findings available to the general audience
until they have had a chance to verify them.
Providing security in P2P environments is difficult
due to the distributed and autonomous nature of the peers.
There are two major challenges: efficiently establishing
authenticated, encrypted communication channels
between the peers and distributing the authentication and
authorization enforcement for shared resources. It is also
desirable that the provider of the resource can securely
control its access without causing a significant burden on
either the provider or the user of that resource. We have
developed security mechanisms for establishing secure
connections between peers and for distributing and
verifying signed authorization policy [1]. Through the
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application of these mechanisms peers can establish
spontaneous trust relationships, and securely share and
access resources in a straightforward manner. We
implemented and applied our security mechanisms in a
secure P2P information sharing application, scishare [2].
Our previous paper [1] concentrated on the
mechanisms of establishing authenticated and encrypted
channels between the peers. This paper describes the
authorization architecture that is required to implement
distributed authorization decisions in a P2P environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First,
we present other work related to authorization in P2P
environments. We introduce a collaborative application
model for a P2P environment in Section 3.  Then, we
discuss the particular authorization challenges of this
environment in Section 4.  In Section 5, we present a
security model that addresses the authorization challenges
of this environment.  Then, we present the authorization
architecture in Section 6.  Finally, we present our
conclusions and future work in Section 7.
2. Related Work
A number of authorization systems have been
developed to provide access control to shared resources in
distributed environments [3][4][5][6]. While these
systems do not address highly dynamic or purely
decentralized collaborations, they provide some useful
concepts. CAS [5] is a system that uses the new IETF
standard X.509 proxy certificates [7] to delegate access
rights from a central server to a user. We intend to use a
similar mechanism to delegate rights from one user to
another in order to facilitate temporary access to
resources. Both Akenti [6] and VOMS [3] use attribute
certificates to assign attributes to users in a verifiable
way.  PRIMA [4] introduces the idea of privilege
management.  A privilege represents the rights that a user
has to a resource and can be stored in a verifiable
certificate.  Each of these systems has some dependence
on central servers to provide the authorized access
information and each depends on a few specified trusted
Certification Authorities (CA) to provide X.509 public
key certificates.
Akenti provides an example of decentralized access
control by permitting most policy to be held in signed
certificates. This allows multiple stakeholders to write
policy for resources.  The Akenti policy decision engine
can then gather and verify the policy and attribute
information. Allowing a new user to access resources still
requires that the user have an X.509 certificate from a
trusted CA. Furthermore, the user must be explicitly
granted some attribute or added to the policy files, which
is not optimal for spontaneous collaborations.
The following P2P applications each provide some
access control over their resources. Groove [8][9] allows
a small group of collaborators to form spontaneous shared
spaces in which they exchange information. It essentially
implements a simple public key infrastructure (PKI)
without certificates to build trust among users. Groove
provides mechanisms for simplifying the building of
collaborations and has automated a number of protocols
to hide the key management issues from the users.  It also
provides support to gradually build trust through its built-
in invitation protocol.  Groove does not support fine-
grained access control to individual resources.
Waste [10] is a secure file-sharing system that
provides security of information within a small, trusted
group of peers.  It secures all communication at the
transport-level using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [11]
and builds a PKI web of trust between the trusted peers.
Waste assumes that all of the trusted peers are equal.  In
addition, peers are forced into trust relationships that are
commutative and associative.  Thus, any peer that is
allowed into the system has full access to all the
information in the system.
LionShare [12][13] is an Internet2 project that aims
to facilitate legitimate file sharing among individuals and
educational institutions around the world. It promises
secure file-sharing capabilities for the easy exchange of
image collections, video archives, large data collections,
and other types of academic information. The LionShare
security model is based on three requirements: files
should not be shared anonymously, an anonymous search
facility should exist, and file owners must have the ability
to control access to their files using verifiable attributes.
3. Application Model
We consider an application that consists of a set of
distributed application components. Each component
provides identical communication and security interfaces,
and is referred to as a peer, Pi.  Each peer, Pi, has a user
identity, Ui associated with it.  The user identity may
represent the person who is using this application
component, the organization that has deployed this
application component, etc.  A single user identity may be
associated with multiple application components, but not
vice versa.
The set of all peers forms a peer group G.  The peers
communicate by exchanging messages.  A peer, Pi, can
send a message to any other peer, Pj, or to the peer group,
G.  Communication between two peers, Pi and Pj, is
direct, i.e. we do not consider the scenario where a third
peer, Pk, acts as proxy, forwarding messages for the
communication.  Messages sent to the peer group G are
intended for every peer in G.  Each message is received
by a proper subset of the intended recipients. The peers
form a closed group in the sense that only peers can send
messages to the group.
A peer, Pi, may disconnect from G at any time.  A
disconnected peer does not receive or send any messages
within G while it is disconnected.  Peers may disconnect
from G frequently and for prolonged periods of time.  The
likelihood of any given peer, Pi, staying connected to
group G for the entire lifetime of G is assumed to be
negligible.
A peer, Pi, may provide a set of resources, R(Pi), to
group G.  A resource may be a file, a scientific
instrument, a chat room, etc.  The holder of the user
identity, Ui, governs access to a resource, R in R(Pi) .  The
peer, Pi, enforces access to this resource, R.  In order to
gain access to a resource a user must have their user
identity authenticated by the peer and meet the
authorization requirements for access to that resource.
4. Authorization Challenges
The application model described in Section 3
provides unique challenges in authorization.  The peer-
based model treats all application components equally;
whether they behave as clients, servers, certificate
authorities, etc.  The dynamic membership of the group
does not allow us to assume that any peer will be highly
available.  Thus, the traditional notions of highly available
certificate authorities and authorization servers are not
applicable.  Their roles need to be filled by the individual
peers, working in concert when appropriate.
The first authorization challenge arises from the
collaborative application requirements to support the
rapid admission of new users.  New collaborators need to
be provided basic access to the application as soon as
possible, i.e. immediately.  This requirement makes
infeasible the standard approach of requiring a central
administrator to authorize each new user.
Revocation of access rights is also a major challenge
in such an environment. Typical solutions, such as the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [14] assume
that an authoritative server is always available. Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) [15] relax this requirement a bit,
but still assume that a fresh CRL can be obtained from an
authoritative server at regular intervals. The Simple
Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [16] allows for
both of these revocation methods.  SCVP allows a client
to delegate certificate path construction and certificate
path validation to a server. The path construction or
validation (e.g. making sure that none of the certificates in
the path are revoked) is performed according to a
validation policy, which contains one or more trust
anchors. It allows simplification of client implementations
and use of a set of predefined validation policies.
The application model also places a stronger security
role on the end-users, who are providers of resources.  In
this model, it is very likely that the end-users are
determining the authorization requirements for accessing
resources. Thus, the authorization interfaces presented to
the average user need to be clear and concise.
5. Security Model
We have designed a security model to meet these
challenges. The underlying assumptions of our model are:
Authentication is based on user identity (e.g an X.509
credential), rather than peer identity (e.g. IP address);
Each user must have some authentication token that can
be recognized by all the other peers on which
authorization rules can be based; All communication
between peers takes place over authenticated encrypted
channels; Each provider is entirely responsible for setting
and enforcing access to the service or resource it provides.
We use X.509 public-key certificates [15] as the
authentication token for the user identities.  This allows us
to leverage existing support for the X.509 public key
infrastructure (PKI).  The X.509 PKI provides scalable
key management, works with widely available TLS
implementations, e.g. OpenSSL[17], to provide secure
connections, and provides keys that can be used to
digitally sign authorization and attribute assertions.
In order to allow new users to easily join an existing
collaboration, we automatically provide a self-signed
X.509 certificate, called a pseudo-certificate, to users the
first time they use the system.  These credentials allow
users that do not already have a credential from a trusted
Certification Authority (CA) to authenticate into the
collaboration. A pseudo-certificate contains a
Distinguished Name (DN) for the user, which is self-
selected and may not be globally unique and a public key
that, due to the sparseness of the key space, is assumed to
be unique.  Thus, pseudo-certificates can be assumed to
be unique and can be used as an authentication token.
Peers can therefore build trust based on pseudo-
certificates. All users of collaborative applications using
this communication model are thus able to immediately
and securely participate in the collaboration.  They do not
have to wait for an administrator to grant them
appropriate credentials just to cross this threshold.
Note that a CA is considered trusted if the relying
party has read and agreed with the CA's certification
policy and has decided to trust the binding between the
DN in the certificate and the individual holding the
private key.  In the case of pseudo-certificates there is no
vetting that the name honestly represents the individual
holding the private key. The only assurance is that the
same key will represent the same individual each time it is
used. Thus all trust in the holder of these keys must be
done individually on the basis of behavior or out-of-band
information.  The handling of access rights revocation in
our model is based on the type of resource being
accessed, as well as the user type.  Our model makes a
clear distinction between users with pseudo-certificates
and those with CA-signed certificates. We use the term
authenticated user to be a user who is known to possess
the private key that corresponds to the pseudo or CA-
signed public-key certificate he has presented and the
term validated user1 to be an authenticated user whose
certificate can be traced back to an accepted CA. The
most significant difference between authentication and
validation is that in the latter process each certificate in
the chain is checked to see if it has been revoked. This
process usually requires access to some central service
provided by the CA.
We classify the resources shared within a
collaborative application as low-value or high-value. The
difference between low-value and high-value resources is
whether all the credentials used in establishing
authorization need to be validated as well as
authenticated.
Access rights are often granted to users based on the
trust placed in the holder of the authentication token.  In
longer-term collaborations, the trust relationships between
users may vary over time.  Thus, it is important to allow
the resource providers to grant and change access rights
for users based on this trust relationship.  In our security
model, resource access policies can range from complete
access to any user to specific access for individual
validated users.  Since all users in our model must be
authenticated a peer is able to capture the certificates of
all of the users it interacts with.  The trust relationship
with these users can then be measured based on off-line
information such as recommendations from other users or
user behavior during previous interactions. Thus, a user
can easily join a collaboration and gradually be granted
access rights.
The policy aspects of our security model are strongly
influenced by our experience with the Akenti
authorization system [6].  Akenti was designed to use
distributed authorization policy, in contrast to the more
common approach of having all policy local to the
resource or alternatively on a central trusted server. The
access policy consists of policy rules, which are stated in
terms of attributes of a user or resource.  Policy rules and
attribute assertions are signed documents (certificates)
that can be stored in a distributed manner and are gathered
from a set of locations and verified at the time the
authorization decision is made. This approach matches
our need to support both local and peer shared policy. An
attribute is simply some characteristic of a user, such as
identity, group membership, a role or a clearance level. A
policy rule states what attributes a user must have to get a
specific type of access to a resource.
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6. Authorization Architecture
In this section we present a flexible authorization
architecture that implements the presented security model.
This architecture is suitable for applications that involve
sharing of high-value resources, as well as general
collaborations where users only need a reasonable sense
of security. We have divided the authorization system into
five components: a Validation Manager that manages,
discovers, and validates X.509 identities, an Attribute
Manager that generates and looks up attribute assertions,
a Policy Manager that creates and shares policy rules, a
Resource Manager that manages the protected resources,
and a Delegation Manager that manages the delegation of
access rights.  At the end of this section we present an
example of how these components interact.
VALIDATION MANAGER
The Validation Manager (VM) allows resource
owners to designate trusted Certification Authorities
(CA).  The VM stores the set of CA X.509 public key
certificates that are trusted by the user.  The user may also
provide the location of the public directories that contain
the X.509 identity certificates issued by a CA and the
location of the certificate revocation lists (CRL)
maintained by a CA.
The VM also checks whether a certificate belongs to
a validated user.  A certificate passes this test if it’s
certificate chain is valid, i.e. the signature of each
certificate can be verified using a public key contained in
the chain, if no entity in the chain has been revoked, and
if one of the CAs in the chain has been stored at the VM.
The VM does not assume that the whole certificate chain
is presented to it with the certificate. It locates any
missing certificates by checking public directories and
P2P resource discovery.  Pseudo-certificates can never be
validated since there is no way to tell if a pseudo-
certificate has been revoked.
In summary, the Validation Manager performs the
following operations: manage the list of trusted CAs.
(add, remove, edit); validate entity (users, attribute
issuers, authorization policy issuers) certificates; search
for X.509 certificates/CRLs using server-based directories
or  P2P discovery; provide X.509 certificates/CRLs in
response to P2P queries.
ATTRIBUTE MANAGER
The Attribute Manager (AM) can support a number
of attributes, such as group, role, organization or
licensing. Without loss of generality, we will concern
ourselves with the group attribute in order to best explain
what this component does. A group is simply a set that
has a name and one or more owners (group authorities).
Groups can be private (used and stored at only one peer)
or public (named sets visible to other users).
A user belongs to a private group if that user's DN or
public key is listed in that group’s set.  A user belongs to
a public group if that user has a ‘valid’ X.509 attribute
certificate [18] for that group signed by one of the group’s
attribute authorities. We note that ‘valid’ does not mean
‘validated’. A valid certificate can pass all the tests
(expiration, signature, etc.) without validating the
attribute authority with the Validation Manager. Our
model allows such certificates to be acceptable when used
during access decisions for low-value resources.  This
allows un-validated users (including pseudo-users) to
manage and belong to groups.
A user can be removed from a private group simply
by removing the user from that group’s set.  Removing a
user from a public group requires the use of a revocation
mechanism much like the one used for X.509 identity
certificates.
In summary, the Attribute Manager performs the
following operations: allow users to create public and
private user attributes; define and manage names of public
attributes so that users can reference them; allow users to
search for public user attributes using P2P queries;
provide public user attribute information (attribute names,
users, owners, attribute certificates and CRLs) in response
to P2P queries; check whether a user satisfies an attribute.
POLICY MANAGER
The Policy Manager (PM) manages and checks
policy rules.  A policy rule has a name, one or more
owners, a condition, and zero or more actions.   Like
attributes, policy rules can be private (stored at the
resource to which it applies) or public (named and visible
to other peers). Public rules are necessary to support
multiple stakeholders who may not have login privileges
at the resource site. Rules can be combined using Boolean
operators ‘and’ and ‘or’. Combined rules are given names
and are marked as public or private. A rule composed of
at least one private rule must also be private. A user that
satisfies a rule’s condition is granted the rights listed in
the rule.
Public rules can be opaque or transparent. Opaque
rules are evaluated at the creator’s site and require the
creator be online. Transparent rules are evaluated by each
involved entity and are used to secure access to common
resources (shared spaces, chat rooms) that are
implemented in a decentralized manner, e.g. on top of a
decentralized secure group communication scheme such
as SGL [19].  In such systems, every peer must be able to
evaluate the policy rule when a member joins or leaves.
The group configuration (members, session key, etc.)
stays consistent across the peers as they all arrive to the
same decision. This decentralized approach allows,
among other things, subgroups of users to persist during
network partitions.
In summary, the Policy Manager performs the
following operations: allow users to create public and
private rules; allow users to search for public rules using
P2P queries; provide public rules in response to P2P
queries; define and manage names of public rules so that
users can reference them; check whether a user satisfies a
rule.
RESOURCE MANAGER
The Resource Manager (RM) allows users to register
their protected resources into a local database and to map
a combined or single policy rule to one or more resources.
Resources can be marked as high-value or low-value.
When enforcing access to high-value resources, the RM
makes sure that all authorization elements are validated.
While this is the rigorous approach to handling distributed
policy, we have found in practice that many P2P
resources do not require that level of security. Thus for
low-value resources, real-time checks for revocation are
skipped and policies are allowed to specify holders of
pseudo-certificates as authorized users and attribute
authorities.  If a relying party has reason to believe that a
pseudo-certificate has been compromised or no longer
trusts the holder of such a certificate, he must take action
to remove any access granted to this user from his
authorization policies.
In summary, the Resource Manager performs the
following operations: allow users to map policies to
resources; allow users to mark resources as high or low
value; search for resources owned by others using P2P
queries; provide resources’ information in response to
P2P queries; determine users’ access rights to resources.
ACCESS DECISION PROCESS
Figure 1 shows how the presented components
interact during an access decision. A user U1 is
attempting to access a resource R owned by user U2. The
Resource Manager, at U2, determines the mapped policy
P and the sensitivity level L. If L is high-value then U1
must be validated and RM calls on the Validation
Manager to perform this check. RM then hands these
arguments together with U1’s name to the Policy
Manager who evaluates the policy P. In this example, P is
private and P’s condition simply requires a user to belong
to group G. Since P is private and thus owned by U2, the
P M  does not need to interact with the VM  to check
whether U2 is validated or not. The PM checks with the
Attribute Manager to see if U1 belongs to group G.  Since
G is public the AM gets the necessary attribute
certificates and calls on the VM to validated G’s
authority. If everything succeeds then the actions listed in
P are returned to the application.
DELEGATION MANAGER
Delegation of access rights to other users provides a
quick and a simple way of allowing temporary and
restricted access to common resources such as shared
spaces and chat rooms.  The benefits are huge since users
can now be invited to join collaborations without having
to go through the long process of obtaining the necessary
attribute credentials.
Resource
Manager
Application
Policy
Manager
Attribute
Manager
Validator
(U1, R)
(U1, P, L)
(U1, G, L)
(U1)
(G's authority)
Figure 1: Access decision steps.
The Delegation Manager (DM) uses a delegation
protocol similar to the one in [5].  At the end of this
protocol a certificate in the form of an X.509 proxy
certificate [7] is generated.  These certificates tie a user to
a list of access rights and can be used as authentication
tokens to SSL/SGL.  The verification process of these
capabilities is rather simple. In the case of an invitation,
the signing party must have an invite capability.  In the
case of an escort, the signing party must have an escort
capability and the guest can only use the resource if the
signing party is present.  Rejecting a user is also
straightforward and can be used to deny access to
someone else’s guest.  We do not address the revocation
of capability certificates as they are meant to have short
lifetimes. Figure 2 shows an example of user U1 inviting
user U2 to resource R.
P2 (U2)P1 (U1)
Delegation
Manager
Application
Resource
Manager
Delegation
Manager
(U1, U2, R, INVITE)
(U1, R, INVITE)
(INVITATION)
Application
(INVITATION)
Figure 2: Invitation example.
In summary, the Delegation Manager performs the
following operations: allow users to invite, escort, or
reject guests; allow users to request invitations and
escorts.
7. Conclusion
We have introduced a flexible security solution for
pure P2P environments. By using a P2P resource
discovery service to discover public groups and policy
rules the overall system is tolerant to policy issuers being
offline or unreachable. The introduction of pseudo-
certificates allows users to easily join a collaborative
application. Our model enforces authenticated access to
public resources, which allows users to meet each other
and facilitates the building of trust relationships. The use
of resource sensitivity levels allows casual collaborations
to be secured without requiring that all users have X.509
public key certificates from trusted CAs. In the future, we
plan to look into caching and duplication mechanisms to
provide a greater range of sensitivity levels.
Our file sharing application has already used many of
these concepts to provide users with a simple and a secure
way of sharing files. We plan to re-engineer it to adopt its
P2P resource discovery service for locating access control
information if such information is not available from
central servers. We also plan to apply our security
implementation to a secure chat application. The results
of these two deployments should help us further evaluate
the usefulness of the various components of our security
model.
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